A robust exposition on Ḥanafī international relations

This essay will revolve around a particular section of Burhān al-dīn al-Marghīnānī’s masterpiece, “al-Hidāyah,” and will include a brief historical overview of premodern approaches to international relations. It is, however, necessary to discuss the situation of international relations in the premodern era before moving forward. Empires fought for global dominance and were constantly in a state of political competitiveness; on that accord, Professor Stephen C. Neff writes:

“The idea of peace as the normal condition of human affairs was far from a natural one. For a very long time, the prevailing view in the ancient world was that war was simply a constant feature of the political landscape, as routine as the coming and going of the seasons of the year. Plato, in The Laws, had one of his speakers voice what was probably a common opinion: that peace was ‘only a fiction’ and that ‘all states by nature are fighting an undeclared war against every other state’. Aristotle believed, famously, that the human species was intrinsically social in nature; but this intrinsic sociality was taken no further than the level of the city-state. Relations between independent city-states were therefore regarded as inherently competitive.” (1)

As we can see, whenever we deal with the topic of international relations, we must contextualise the matter within the historical and political landscape of that particular time. Doing otherwise would simply be disingenuous. Thus, the situation we are dealing with is a conquer-or-be conquered situation. This is especially clear to historians who deal with the rise of the Islamic Empire (2).

It is also evident that, in the modern era, peacekeeping missions and the United Nations itself are the only things keeping the globe peaceful. However, imagine for a moment supposing none of these institutions existed. Would there be war or would there be peace? The reader must see that nations would attack one another in advance, causing turmoil to spread throughout the entire planet.

Who is al-Marghīnānī?

This question is an important pre-requisite in order to establish what is Ḥanafī doctrine and what isn’t. Since this essay is going to be revolving around the words of al-Marghīnānī it is crucial to understand who he actually is and his position in the Ḥanafī school of law. He is: Burhān al-dīn Abū al-Ḥasan al-Marghīnānī. He is famous for writing one of the primary texts (mutūn) in the Ḥanafī school of law; Bidāyatul Mubtadī. He died in the year 593AH which corresponds to the Gregorian year of 1197CE.

This text gathers between the words of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Qudūrī in his abridgement (mukhtaṣar) and Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan’s words in his al-Jām‘ī al-Ṣaghīr. It gained popularity and acceptance that the Imam decided to write upon it a explanation called al-Kifāyah. However, upon completion the Imam realised it was way too long so he decided to write a shorter explanation of the text called “al-Hidāyah”. This text gained popularity and wide acceptance across the Muslim world and became a relied upon manual of jurisprudence. Nothing has been written like it in Islamic jurisprudence and it has hundreds of explanations written on it. It’s phrases (‘ibarāt) became famous and widespread across later books of Ḥanafī jurisprudence which came after it such as al-Maydānī’s “Lubāb” and al-Zayla’īs “Tabyīn”.

Al-Marghīnānī’s theory of Jihad and the possibility of peace

Jihad is a communal obligation in Ḥanafī jurisprudence, there is never a time where it can be abrogated. This is a command from God which the Muslim community has agreed upon. But before raising questions about whether peace can be maintained it is important to know the purpose of Jihad and why it is legislated. Al-Marghīnānī explains the reasoning on why offensive warfare is an obligation, he writes:

“The reason is that it has not been made a definitive obligation for itself, as in itself it is disruptive. It has been made a definitive obligation for strengthening the religion of Allah and for driving away evil from His servants.” (3)

The word used for “strengthening” is the Arabic word “i’zāz” which comes from the word “‘izzah”. The word “izzah” is the antonym of humiliation (4). Thus it is known that humiliation occurs when the enemy conquers Muslim lands so in order to avoid that humiliation happening the antonym must be achieved which is by offensive warfare as it was the customary political norm of that time. As a result, the basic goal of Jihad is to defend Muslims and their territories in a world where nations wage war on one another in the absence of peace treaties. Because the United Nations and other international agreements for peacekeeping did not exist during the pre-modern era, the introduction of these treaties marked a dramatic shift in the political landscape from the pre-modern to the modern era, which explains why this is not understood in our day and age. This purpose of Jihad was acknowledged amongst Ḥanafī theologians before al-Marghīnānī consider for example the words of Abū al-Mu’īn al-Nasafī:

“As for Jihad, then he, upon him be peace, is specified with it, and there has not been a religion from the religions that came with what he came with. And it is what the utmost of divine wisdom dictates, for it protects the community and its sacred things. And had it not been for the people of religion to defend the religion and borders with the sword, then the enemies would defeat them, corruption would appear on land and sea, and mosques would be destroyed. He (peace be upon him) was commanded, specifically with Jihad, in a manner discernible to those with insight, making it clear that this directive is not grounded in self-interest or motivated by political gains.” (5)

What should be kept in mind is that this is not merely a wisdom from it’s legislation which has no legal impact but rather it is considered a sabab (cause) for the legislation of offensive warfare. This was echoed by the early Ḥanafī legal philosopher (usūlī) and judge Abū Zayd al-Dabbūsī, he writes:

“Our (Ḥanafī) scholars said: The reason (sabab) for the permissibility of fighting with the people of warfare is them being in a state of war against us.” (6)

The objective of Jihad, as it is evident, is to protect against the threat of the non-believers. It is noteworthy to acknowledge, nonetheless, that Ḥanafī jurists distinguished between the objective of Jihad and the rationale behind its legitimacy. It is allowed since they are in a state of war against us, even though its ultimate purpose (ghāyah) is to convert people to Islam. It is therefore not inconsistent to declare that the goal of Jihad is to spread Islam and that it is only acceptable based on the fact they are in an active state of war against us.

Another question can be proposed and it is how can we reconcile between the command of Jihad and the possibility of peace. Imam al-Marghīnānī seeks to reconcile both concepts by categorising Jihad into two folds:

1. Meaning
2. Form (physical combat)

He explains the reason why a pact of security is permitted, he writes:

“The reason is that a negotiated settlement is Jihad in meaning if it is in the interests of the Muslims, because the purpose (of Jihad) is to repel the evil that will result from continued hostilities; It is not necessary to limit the duration of the settlement to what is narrated (ten years) due to the extension of the purpose in excess of that, as distinguished from the case where it is not in the interest of the Muslims, because that would amount to giving up Jihad in both form and meaning.” (7)

As we can see; al-Marghīnānī is the first Ḥanafī scholar to reconcile between the continuous obligation of Jihad with peace. He utilises a Maqāṣid al-Sharī’ah (objectives of the law) approach to understand the purpose of why Jihad was legislated in an effort for the legitimisation of pacts of security (al-Muwāda‘ah). This theory was followed by all the commentators of al-Hidāyah and the commentators of al-Kanz such as Fakhruddīn al-Zay’laī (8) and Zainuddīn Ibn Nujaym (9) thus making it a relied upon position in the school. Ibn al-Humām who was labelled as the seal of scholarly verifiers (khātimatul muḥaqqiqīn) and arguably wrote the most important commentary of al-Hidāyah elaborates on the point we have been making in this essay. In commenting on al-Marghīnānī’s words:

“because that would amount to giving up Jihad in both form and meaning.”

He writes:

“And the pact of security has not been permitted except for the fact that it is considered Jihad and this objective is fulfilled if there is a political interest for the Muslims in a pact of security.” (10)

Ibn al-Humām also utilises the statement of God:

“And fight against the disbelievers collectively as they fight against you collectively.”

To prove that our offensive warfare is a recompense and caused from them being in a state of war against us (11).

This principle was maintained up until the 18th century, with the prominent legal theorist al-Bihārī reaffirming that the ‘illah (jus ad bellum) for offensive warfare is indeed the danger (ḥirābah) posed by an enemy with no pact of security. The most famous commentary on al-Bihārī’s text and one of the most important manuals of legal theory in the Ḥanafī school further reinstates that disbelief per se is not a legitimate jus ad bellum because the mere disbelief of others poses no threat to Muslims’s security.

Al-Bihārī writes:

“The Shāfi’īs stipulated that disbelief per se was the jus ad bellum (‘illa) whilst the Ḥanafīs stipulated that the jus ad bellum is the disbelievers being in a state of warfare against us.” (12)

The commentator, al-Lukknawī writes:

“And (the position of the Ḥanafīs) is the truth, for indeed, the disbelief of others does not harm us, but rather their warfare against us is the jus ad bellum for us killing them and waging Jihad against them.” (13)

Conclusion:

The claim that Islam obligatesaggressive warfare is accurate, as we have shown, but it has been totally isolated from the political and historical background, as we have further demonstrated from a Ḥanafī standpoint. We have also demonstrated the application of a Maqaṣid al-Sharī’ah theory for the possibility of peace without negating the obligation of Jihad by al-Marghīnānī.